
He argues that legitimate authority requires genuine public reasoning — and that this is not a utopian ideal but a practical demand.
Habermas grew up in postwar Germany and asked the question that haunted his generation: how did a civilization of high culture and systematic philosophy produce Auschwitz? His answer drew on the Frankfurt School and on the philosophy of language. What had gone wrong was the reduction of reason to its instrumental form — the optimization of means toward given ends. What was needed was communicative rationality: the kind of reason exercised in genuine dialogue, where the only force is the force of the better argument. His Theory of Communicative Action built this into a philosophy of society. His later work on democracy argued that legitimate political authority requires a public sphere in which citizens reason together without coercion. He is one of the last survivors of the generation that rebuilt European thought after the catastrophe. He has not stopped arguing.

“Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech.”
“Modernity — an incomplete project.”
In 1956, Habermas became Adorno's assistant at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. He absorbed the tradition of critical theory — the commitment to joining social analysis with emancipatory aims — and began to transform it. Where the older Frankfurt theorists grew pessimistic about reason, Habermas found in it an unrealized democratic potential.
Published in two volumes in 1981, this was Habermas's central systematic work: an account of how reason is embedded in language and communication. Rational action, he argues, is inherently oriented toward mutual understanding. From this he derives his theory of democracy: legitimacy comes from reasoned public discourse.
Arendt's analysis of the political realm as the space of appearance, argument, and plural action is a central source for Habermas's theory of communicative rationality and the public sphere.